The idea of expanding the membership of Yemen’s Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) has resurfaced amid a prolonged political deadlock and an unending war. One scenario increasingly discussed among analysts is the possibility of incorporating Houthi representatives into the PLC—an unconventional political breakthrough that could fundamentally reshape Yemen’s conflict landscape.
Under this scenario, two additional seats would be added to the PLC, specifically reserved for figures representing the Sana’a-based Houthi authority. This step would not be intended to dissolve or weaken the Houthis’ de facto government in Sana’a, but rather to acknowledge the realities on the ground while opening broader space for national coordination.
Such a model would formalize an institutionalized dualism. The Houthi administration would continue to manage day-to-day governance in northern Yemen, while the PLC would serve as a shared political umbrella representing Yemen collectively on issues of sovereignty, diplomacy, and the country’s future.
If realized, the PLC would begin to resemble mechanisms such as the Gulf Cooperation Council or even the loosely structured Gulf monarchies. The fundamental difference is that the PLC would unite de facto authorities rather than fully sovereign states. Each actor would retain control over its territory and power, yet sit at a single table for strategic decision-making.
The core objective of this approach is to defuse an existential conflict. As long as the Houthis are treated solely as an enemy to be totally defeated, war is likely to persist. Granting them seats in the PLC would shift the struggle from the battlefield to the political arena.
One immediate advantage of this arrangement would be the creation of a permanent communication channel. Until now, Yemeni dialogue has largely depended on external mediation, whether through the United Nations or regional actors. A more inclusive PLC would allow dialogue to take place within Yemen’s own political framework.
One of the most sensitive issues concerns international legitimacy. If Houthi representatives become official members of the PLC, they could technically speak in international forums, including the United Nations, on behalf of the Yemeni state. This would resolve the long-standing paradox in which the force controlling the capital lacks an official global voice.
For the international community, this model could also provide clarity. Instead of dealing with two rival governments that negate each other, the world would engage with a single collective body that acknowledges Yemen’s internal plurality of power.
The key question, however, is whether the Houthis would agree. From their perspective, PLC membership could represent an upgrade in political status without requiring them to relinquish military control. At the same time, participation may be seen as an implicit endorsement of a political structure they have long portrayed as an extension of foreign intervention.
The Houthis would also calculate the symbolic costs and benefits. They have built their legitimacy on the narrative of a revolutionary authority operating outside the old system. Sitting on the PLC would mean accepting a state framework they have consistently criticized.
On the PLC side and among its allies, resistance would also be strong. Incorporating the Houthis would mean accepting them as a legitimate part of the state—an extremely difficult step for factions that have lost territory, resources, and thousands of lives during the war.
Nevertheless, some analysts argue that this scenario is not about total reconciliation, but about conflict management. An inclusive PLC would not solve all problems, but it could freeze large-scale hostilities and open space for gradual compromise.
If successful, the PLC could function as a coordination forum among rival power centers, similar to elite consensus mechanisms in Gulf states, where differing interests coexist within mutually agreed red lines for the sake of stability.
This model could also help curb further fragmentation. Without a national framework, Yemen risks breaking into permanently separated mini-entities. A PLC that includes the Houthis might become the last remaining symbol of unity.
The risk of failure, however, is substantial. Without clear mechanisms for power-sharing and authority, the PLC could turn into a permanent veto arena, slowing decision-making and deepening mistrust.
Regional actors would play a decisive role. Saudi Arabia might see this as an honorable exit from a long war, while Iran would assess whether Houthi interests remain adequately protected.
For the United Nations, such a scenario aligns with a growing realist approach that recognizes de facto actors as part of the solution rather than merely the problem.
Ultimately, adding PLC seats for the Houthis is not about idealistic unity, but about recognizing Yemen’s current reality. The country is no longer unified, yet not fully divided either.
Whether this scheme would strengthen unity or merely freeze the conflict remains an open question. But amid total deadlock, it offers something rare in the Yemeni conflict: a middle path that has not yet been completely closed.
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